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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Christopher, diagnosed at six years old with Asperger’s Syndrome,1 is a child 
with a disability.2  Upon his diagnosis, Christopher’s public school developed his 
Individualized Education Program (IEP)3 to serve Christopher’s educational needs; 
however, his needs went unmet.  Throughout Christopher’s four years at his public 
school, his parents repeatedly met with school officials about the appropriateness of 
services being offered to Christopher as his IEP did not account for the 
individualized class support Christopher required.4  Despite consistent and dedicated 
efforts by his parents, school officials continually informed them there was nothing 
more the school or teachers could do.5  Unwilling to risk their son’s educational 
future and unsure they would be able to disprove the vague “meaningful educational 
benefit” substantive standard of review for an IEP, Christopher’s parents assumed 
                                                                
1Asperger’s Syndrome is an autism spectrum disorder in which a person exhibits 
deficiencies in social and communication skills.  Online Asperger’s Syndrome Information 
and Support, http://www.udel.org/bki rby/asperger/aswhatisit.html (last visited on Nov. 29, 
2005).  These deficiencies are generally marked by a person’s difficulty to read body language 
and use language in a social context as many people with Asperger’s Syndrome are very 
literal.  Id.  Persons with Asperger’s Syndrome also exhibit difficulties with transitions or 
change.  Id.  In spite of these deficiencies, persons with this syndrome normally have average 
IQ’s, and many possess exceptional talent or skill in a specific area.  Id. 
2The following story reflects events of Christopher’s education as reported by Clara V. in 
a telephone interview.  The name of the interviewee has been changed to respect the privacy 
of the party.  Telephone Interview with Clara V., parent, in Cleveland, OH. (Oct. 2, 2005); see 
also, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2006).  A child with a disability means: 
A child-- (i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech 
or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional 
disturbance (referred to in this title [20 USCS §§ 1400 et seq.] as “emotional 
disturbance”), orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health 
impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, needs 
special education and related services.  (B) Child aged 3 through 9. The term “child 
with a disability” for a child aged 3 through 9 (or any subset of that age range, 
including ages 3 through 5), may, at the discretion of the State and the local 
educational agency, include a child-- (i) experiencing developmental delays, as 
defined by the State and as measured by appropriate diagnostic instruments and 
procedures, in 1 or more of the following areas: physical development; cognitive 
development; communication development; social or emotional development; or 
adaptive development; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and 
related services.  
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2006). 
3An Individualized Education Program is, “a written statement for each child with a 
disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with section 1414(d).”  
MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 170 (2000).  
4Telephone Interview with Clara V., supra note 2. 
5Id. 
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the costs of placing their child in a private school specializing in educating children 
with disabilities.6    
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or the Act) identifies 
thirteen categories of disabilities that qualify children for its educational protections.7 
The Act was devised to provide children with qualifying disabilities a “free 
appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services 
designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, 
employment, and independent living.”8  Problematic, however, is IDEA’s failure to 
define the term “appropriate.”9  Therefore, the United States Supreme Court in Board 
of Education v. Rowley10 defined “appropriate” by stating schools have met this 
substantive standard if an IEP confers “some educational benefit.”11  This definition, 
“conferring an educational benefit,”12 has purposely been left very broad as the 
courts have avoided establishing more stringent guidelines regarding the substantive 
aspect of an IEP.13   
The recent Reauthorization of the IDEA seeks to raise the bar regarding what 
constitutes an “appropriate” education.  The Reauthorized IDEA, which became 
effective July 1, 2005 and entitled the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEIA), amended the IDEA and changed the established 
substantive guideline by emphasizing and outlining new provisions that must be 
present for an IEP to be deemed “appropriate” in addition to increasing training and 
qualifications of special educators.14  These substantive provisions require courts to 
alter their interpretations of what is considered an “appropriate” education for 
students with disabilities.  The IDEIA demands a more rigorous substantive 
                                                                
6Id. 
720 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2006).  The thirteen categories of disabilities identified in the 
IDEA are: cognitive delays, hearing impairments, speech or language impairments, serious 
emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health 
impairments, multiple disabilities, deafness and blindness, and preschooler with a disability.  
Id. 
820 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
9Tara L. Eyer, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the Basic 
Floor of Opportunity Community for Children With Disabilities, 103 DICK. L. REV. 613, 619 
(1999). 
10Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
11Id. at 206-07.  The Court stated:  
A court’s inquiry in suits brought under § 1415(e)(2) is twofold.  First, has the State 
complied with the procedures set forth in the Act?  And second, is the individualized 
educational program developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to 
enable the child to receive educational benefits?  If these requirements are met, the 
State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can 
require no more. 
Id. 
12Id. 
13Id. at 207. 
1420 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006). 
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guideline for IEP measurement than the “some educational benefit” standard 
developed in Rowley.15  Courts should therefore adopt the “educational opportunity” 
standard proposed by the concurring and dissenting opinions in Rowley as the new 
substantive standard defining “appropriate” with regards to a “free appropriate public 
education.”  
Part II of this paper examines the historical evolution of the IDEIA.  Part III 
explains the current substantive standard of “appropriate” as defined by Rowley.  Part 
IV discusses the concurring and dissenting opinions from Rowley and the 
“educational opportunity” standard that these opinions propose to be the substantive 
standard supported by the law and congressional intent.  Part V analyzes the 
decisions of the Third16 and Sixth17 Circuit Courts of Appeals post-Rowley and the 
implications the decisions have on adopting a more viable substantive meaning for 
“appropriate” within the definition of a “free appropriate public education.”  Part VI 
highlights the amendments to the Act in the recent Reauthorization and how these 
amendments establish a need for the adoption of a higher substantive standard.  Part 
VII furthers the proposition that a new substantive standard should be adopted by the 
courts by analyzing the congressional intent and goals for the IDEIA.  Part VIII 
proposes that the new substantive standard by which to measure a child’s special 
education program should be the educational opportunity standard pronounced in 
Rowley’s concurring and dissenting opinions.  Part IX analyzes the effect of financial 
considerations on the adoption of a new substantive standard and concludes that 
these constraints should not hinder the progress that the IDEIA seeks to ensure for 
the education of students with disabilities.  Part X concludes that the definition 
purported in Rowley is no longer applicable because of the amendments made in the 
IDEIA and the congressional intent.       
II.  THE HISTORY OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION 
IMPROVEMENT ACT 
A.  Background 
In the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education, the United States 
Supreme Court determined all children must be afforded an equal educational 
opportunity.18  While the Court was primarily speaking to the inequality of racially 
segregated public schools, the decision also impacted parents of disabled students.19   
Brown provided the foundation for parents of children with disabilities to begin to 
challenge school districts for the segregation of disabled children.20  These 
                                                                
15See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200. 
16See Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988); see 
also Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of. Educ., 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004). 
17Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
18JASPER, supra note 3, at 2. 
19Id. 
20Id.  “‘[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education . . . [S]uch an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.’”  
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).  Id. 
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challenges first arose in two federal district court cases that both ruled in favor of 
providing students with disabilities access to public education.21   
In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania,22 the district court enjoined state officials and school districts from 
denying or postponing “any mentally retarded child access to a free public program 
of education and training.”23  Mills v. Board of Education24 further held that no child 
eligible for public education shall be excluded from public school placement unless 
“such child is provided (a) an adequate alternative educational services suited to the 
child’s needs, which may include special education or tuition grants, and (b) a 
constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review of the child’s status, 
progress, and the adequacy of any educational alternative.”25  Even with these two 
district court holdings in conjunction with the Supreme Court in Brown stipulating 
that “education is a ‘right which must be made available to all on equal terms,’” 
children with disabilities were continually segregated from regular education 
programming for twenty-one years following the Brown decision.26   
Prior to 1975, the educational needs of “millions of children with disabilities 
were not being fully met.”27  Schools continued to routinely exclude children with 
                                                                
21Heather J. Russell, Note, Florence County School District Four v. Carter: A Good 
“IDEA;” Suggestions for Implementing the Carter Decision and Improving the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1479, 1482 (1996); Jennifer A. Knox, 
Comment, The IDEIA Amendments of 1997 and the Private Schools Provision: Seeking 
Improved Special Education, But Serving Only a Select Few, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 201, 203 
(1999).  As stated by Knox, “[t]wo federal district court cases, Pa. Ass'n for Retarded 
Children v. Pa. and Mills v. Bd. of Educ., further paved the road for equal education for the 
disabled by requiring all states to provide disabled children with a free public education.”  Id. 
22Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pa., 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 
1971). 
23Id. at 1258.   
24Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp 866 (D.D.C. 1972).   
25Id. at 878.   
26Rebecca Weber Goldman, Comment, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least 
Restrictive Environment: Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 243 (1994). 
2720 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2005).  In its findings regarding the enactment of the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Congress found:  
Before the date of enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975 (Public law 94-142) [enacted Nov. 29, 1975], the educational needs of millions 
of children with disabilities were not being fully met because— 
(A) the children did not receive appropriate educational services; 
(B) the children were excluded entirely from the public school system and from being 
educated with their peers; 
(C) undiagnosed disabilities prevented the children from having a successful 
educational experience; or 
(D) a lack of adequate resources within the public school system forced families to 
find services outside the public school system.   
Id.  
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disabilities from the educational setting,28 allowing only children with mild 
impairments to participate in regular classrooms.29  Children with moderate 
disabilities received little more than custodial care services at school and severely 
disabled students were referred to institutions.30  In response to this monumental 
disparate educational treatment that students with disabilities received in comparison 
to their non-disabled peers, the federal government enacted The Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act in 1975.31  
B.  The Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) sought to ensure all 
handicapped children would be legally entitled to an education32 by providing 
substantial federal financial assistance to all public schools that were in compliance 
with its standards and were committed to educating disabled students.33  One such 
standard set forth by this Act established a child’s substantive right to a “free 
appropriate public education” (FAPE).34  In providing students with a disability a 
FAPE, schools became responsible for locating and identifying students suspected of 
possessing a disability, engaging a multi-disciplinary team to conduct evaluations, 
and developing a personalized education program based on the needs of the child.35  
The EAHCA also stipulated that a FAPE should be provided in the least restrictive 
environment able to meet the student’s unique needs and in an environment that 
includes non-disabled peers to the extent possible.36    
                                                                
28JASPER, supra note 3, at 1; see also Christopher Thomas Leahy & Michael A. Mugman, 
Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Due Process 
Challenges, 29 VT. L. REV. 951, 952 (2005).  
29JASPER, supra note 3, at 1; see also Charlene K. Quade, A Crystal Clear Idea: The Court 
Confounds the Clarity of Rowley and Contorts Congressional Intent, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. 
& POL’Y 37, 47 (2001).   “In 1975, Congress noted that greater than eight million children 
with disabilities lived in the United States, half of which did not receive appropriate 
educational services and nearly two million of the children identified were excluded from 
educational opportunities entirely.”  Id. 
30Goldman, supra note 26, at 246-47; see also Quade, supra note 29, at 38.  “Before the 
enactment of IDEA, . . . roughly 200,000 children with disabilities were living in institutional 
settings and only one in five were being educated.”  Quade, supra note 29, at 38. 
31JASPER, supra note 3, at 3.  The Education for All Handicapped Children Act was 
enacted on November 19, 1975.  Id.    
32Id.   
33Id. at 16.  See also Goldman, supra note 26, at 249 (stating that the “federal government 
enacted new legislation in the 1970s to increase both access to education and funding of 
special programs”).  
34JASPER, supra note 3, at 16; see also Goldman, supra note 26, at 253; see also Leahy & 
Mugman, supra note 28, at 952.   
35Goldman, supra note 26, at 251. 
36JASPER, supra note 3, at 16. 
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C.  The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
Even though the EAHCA proposed a dramatic educational reform through its 
provision of a FAPE for students with disabilities, the Act’s programs failed in 
meeting Congress’s desired educational goals.37  Students with disabilities were still 
not being educated appropriately in accordance with the established standards of the 
EAHCA and Congress’s ideals.38  Therefore, Congress reauthorized the EAHCA in 
1990 and titled the new legislation the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA).39  Providing a FAPE, however, remained an imperative function of the 
IDEA40 as emphasis continued to be placed upon this provision.41  The IDEA defined 
“free appropriate public education” as: 
Special education and related services that (1) have been provided at 
public expenses, under public supervision and direction, and without 
charge, (2) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (3) include 
an appropriate preschool, elementary or secondary school education in the 
State involved, and (4) are provided in conformity with the individualized 
education program. . . .42 
The IDEA stipulated that, regardless of the severity of a disability, every child 
classified as a student with a disability must receive a “free appropriate public 
education.”43  Furthermore, the “free appropriate public education” required to be 
provided is determined for each child based on that child’s specific needs and goals 
documented in the child’s IEP.44  The IEP is the document that identifies and defines 
the special educational services to be rendered to a child with a disability.45  Thus, an 
IEP identifies a child’s “appropriate” education.46  It is a written statement, 
developed, reviewed, and revised for each child with a disability47 that must include: 
                                                                
37Knox, supra note 21, at 204.  “Class size also increased, in addition to teachers’ 
workloads, which hindered teachers’ abilities to provide appropriate education. Moreover, 
Congress found that disabled children were not being reached - few programs provided direct 
services, and only small numbers of children received these services through the aid of 
research and demonstration projects.”  Id. 
38Id.   
39Id. 
40Goldman, supra note 26, at 243.   
41JASPER, supra note 3, at 22. 
42Eyer, supra note 9, at 616-17. 
43JASPER, supra note 3, at 22. 
44James R. Demmel, Delaware Valley School District v. Daniel G.: Did the 
Commonwealth Court Create a New Standard for Determining Whether School Districts 
Provide Appropriate Education for Disabled Students?, 12 WIDENER L. J. 271, 273 (2003). 
45Terry Jean Seligmann, Rowley Comes Home to Roost: Judicial Review of Autism Special 
Education Disputes, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 217, 223 (2005). 
46Goldman, supra note 26, at 278.  “The IEP is ‘the centerpiece of [IDEA’s] education 
delivery system’ because it essentially defines a particular child’s ‘appropriate’ education.”  
See also Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law, 
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(1) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such 
child; (2) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional 
objectives; (3) a statement of the specific educational services to be 
provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to 
participate in regular education programs; (4) a statement of the needed 
transition services for students . . . [and] the projected date for initiation 
and anticipated duration of such services; and (5) appropriate objective 
criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at 
least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being 
achieved.48   
In addition to these provisions, the IDEA also develops multiple procedural 
safeguards to ensure its stipulations are being met.49  These safeguards allow parents 
to challenge a school district in an impartial hearing before a state administrative 
hearing officer when parents believe their child’s rights guaranteed under the IDEA 
have been violated.50  This reauthorization essentially strengthened and expanded 
upon procedures established by the EAHCA.51  Divided into four parts,52 the 
legislation became “the most significant piece of legislation affecting the educational 
rights of disabled children.”53  
D.  1997 Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
The IDEA was amended in 1997.  Even though the definition of a “free 
appropriate public education” remained, the 1997 amendments to the Act attempted 
to refine the substantive standard of “appropriate” by emphasizing greater 
expectations for the educational achievement of students with disabilities.54  Upon 
                                                           
2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 561, 572 (2003).  “The IEP is the cornerstone of providing FAPE.  
Courts look to whether an IEP is appropriate when assessing whether a school district has 
provided FAPE.”  Id.  
4720 U.S.C. § 1401(14) (2006).  
48Eyer, supra note 9, at 617-18. 
49See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006); see also Goldman, supra note 26, at 253. 
50Seligmann, supra note 45, at 230.   
51JASPER, supra note 3, at 16.   
52Id. at 21.  The four sections are: (A) General Provisions.  Definitions and Other Issues; 
(B) Assistance for Education of All Children with Disabilities; (C) Infants and Toddlers with 
Disabilities, and (D) National Activities to Improve Education of Children with Disabilities.  
Id.   
53Id. at 16; see also IDEA: What’s Good for Kids?  What Works for Schools Before the S. 
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) [hereinafter 
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins).  “No matter what else can be said about the 
program, no matter what other problems still need to be resolved, we can be proud that IDEA 
has helped to ensure that the educational needs of some of our most disabled children are 
being met.”  Id. 
54Eyer, supra note 9, at 613, 619; see also Ingrid Carlson Barrier, Tenth Circuit Surveys: 
Education, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 785, 789 (1999).  “In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA 
because Congress believed ‘that the critical issue now is to place greater emphasis on 
2006-07] THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION 147 
findings that the Act had not succeeded for many students with disabilities, Congress 
desired to improve educational outcomes through amendments targeted at 
heightening substantive requirements.55  According to Congress, improving 
educational outcomes directly correlates to IEP development as the IEP is “critical to 
improving compliance with the Act and to ensuring the statutory rights of the child 
with disabilities.”56  The amendments strengthened evaluation procedures57 and 
significantly demanded more procedures be followed in the formulation of a child’s 
IEP.58  Essentially, the amendments increased procedural requirements in an effort to 
confer more substantive rights and provide a better definition of “appropriate.”59  
Without congressional endorsement, however, the amendments did not achieve 
success in implementing a more rigorous standard for “appropriate” than that 
determined in Rowley.60    
III.  BOARD OF EDUCATION V. ROWLEY: THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD DEFINING 
“APPROPRIATE” 
A.  Facts and Procedural History 
In Board of Education v. Rowley, the United States Supreme Court, for the first 
and only time,61 established the authority defining “appropriate” with regard to a 
“free appropriate public education.”62  Amy Rowley, a deaf child, successfully 
completed kindergarten in a regular classroom with the assistance of an FM hearing 
                                                           
improving student performance and ensuring that children with disabilities receive a quality 
public education.’”  Id.  See also Johnson, supra note 46, at 566-67, 578. 
55Quade, supra note 29, at 38-39. 
56Id. at 51. 
57Id.  Students must be assessed once every three years and evaluation procedures must 
include review of relevant data such as a medical diagnosis and past educational performance.  
Id.  The evaluation process must also review any information provided by the parent(s) of the 
child.  Id.   
58Eyer, supra note 9, at 632.  There must now be a statement of measurable annual goals, a 
statement indicating how the disability affects the child’s involvement and progress in the 
general curriculum, and a statement describing the methods employed to measure the child’s 
progress toward annual goals.  Id.  
59Id. at 631. 
60Id. at 634 (stating that “Congress’ silence must be taken as an endorsement of the 
standard’s continued validity given the key role of Rowley’s principles in development of the 
IDEA over the past twenty-two years.  Absent legislation imposing a new standard, there is 
little support for abandoning the ‘educational benefit’ test”).   
61Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 863 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that 
“Rowley is the only Supreme Court decision to have addressed the level of educational benefit 
that must be provided pursuant to an IEP”). 
62Steven N. Robinson, Note, Rowley: The Court’s First Interpretation of the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 941, 943 (1983).  The 
Supreme Court interpreted the EAHCA for the first time in Rowley.  Id.   
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aid63 and school personnel learning sign-language interpretation.64  Amy’s IEP, 
developed when she entered first grade, provided for Amy to be educated in a regular 
classroom with use of her FM hearing aid.65  The IEP also stipulated Amy would 
receive supplemental services from a tutor and speech therapist.66  Desiring a sign-
language interpreter instead of the offered assistance, the Rowleys disagreed with the 
school’s proposal.67  They asserted their procedural rights under the Act68 and filed 
for a hearing before an impartial officer, claiming Amy’s IEP did not afford her a 
“free appropriate public education” as guaranteed by the EAHCA.69 
Upon a review of the evidence, the impartial officer quashed the Rowley’s 
challenge explaining Amy’s academic and social success in kindergarten established 
that an interpreter was an unnecessary accommodation.70  After an affirmation by the 
New York Commission of Education, the Rowleys appealed to the District Court for 
the Southern District of New York.71  The district court, finding a discrepancy 
between Amy’s potential and her actual achievement, reversed the ruling of the two 
lower authorities, determining Amy did not receive a “free appropriate public 
education.”72  After the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the district 
court’s decision, the school district then petitioned for review by the Supreme 
Court.73  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the interpretation of “free 
appropriate public education” made by the lower courts.74  
                                                                
63An FM hearing aid is a listening system which picks up a speaker’s voice through use of 
a microphone and then transmits it as a radio signal directly to the person wearing a hearing 
aid.  American Hearing Aid Associates, http://www.ahaanet.com/glossary.asp#F (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2005).   
64Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184 (1982). 
65Id.   
66Id. (stating that “Amy should be educated in a regular classroom . . . , should continue to 
use the FM hearing aid, and should receive instruction from a tutor for the deaf for one hour 
each day and from a speech therapist for three hours each week”). 
67Id.   
6820 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006).   
69Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.   
70Id.  (explaining that “[a]fter receiving evidence from both sides, the examiner agreed 
with the administrators’ determination that an interpreter was not necessary because ‘Amy was 
achieving educationally, academically, and socially’ without such assistance”). 
71Id.   
72Id. at 185-86 (“This disparity between Amy’s education and her potential led the court to 
decide that she was not receiving a ‘free appropriate education,’ which the court defined as ‘an 
opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to 
other children.’”). 
73Id. at 186. 
74Id.  
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B.  The Supreme Court’s Opinion 
In its decision, the Court examined both the statutory language and 
congressional intent of the Act to determine the definition of “appropriate.”75  
Echoing the language from Mills, the Court stated that deciding whether the offered 
special education programming is appropriate hinges on two questions.76  First, it 
must be decided whether the State complied with the procedures stipulated in the 
Act.77  Second, it must be decided whether the “individualized educational program 
developed through the Act’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the child 
to receive educational benefits.”78  The second question pertains to the substantive 
standard of what constitutes the meaning of “appropriate.”  According to the 
statutory definition, the Court reasoned that if supportive services combined with 
individualized instruction allow a child to gain an educational benefit, an 
“appropriate” education is being offered.79  Furthermore, such services and 
instruction must be provided at public expense, approximate grade levels used in 
regular education programs, meet state educational standards, and align with the 
child’s IEP.80    
Congressional intent further confirms this determination as “some standard for 
FAPE was ‘implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a free 
appropriate public education.’”81  However, Congress sought to merely ensure that 
public education was accessible to handicapped children, not require that such 
education would be anything greater than meaningful.82  Therefore, the Court 
overturned the district Court’s ruling that an “appropriate” education needs to 
                                                                
75Id. at 190.  The Court stated, “[a]lthough we find the statutory definition of ‘free 
appropriate public education’ to be helpful in our interpretation of the Act, there remains the 
question of whether the legislative history indicates a congressional intent that such education 
meet some additional substantive standard.”  Id. 
76Id. at 206-07. 
77Id.  
78Id.  
79Id. at 189. 
80RONALD D. WENKART, APPROPRIATE EDUCATION FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: 
HOW COURTS DETERMINE COMPLIANCE WITH THE IDEA 5 (2000) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203-04 (1982)).  See also Johnson, supra note 46, at 564. 
81Johnson, supra note 46, at 564. 
82Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192 (“By passing the Act, Congress sought primarily to make public 
education available to handicapped children.  But in seeking to provide such access to public 
education, Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational 
standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful.”). 
150 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 20:139 
maximize a child’s potential.83  Instead, the Court held an education need only confer 
“some educational benefit” to meet the substantive standard of the Act.84   
Applying this rationale, the Act does not promise academic success but does 
promise “some educational benefit.”85  The standard of a “free appropriate public 
education” is designed to implement only a basic floor of opportunity.86 While it 
ensures that the door to a public education will be open, it does not guarantee a 
specified substantive educational level.87  To meet the substantive standard of the 
Act, a student’s IEP must provide only an appropriate education, not necessarily the 
best education.88  Consequently, an appropriate education must produce only some 
progress in both academic and non-academic settings.89  
IV.  THE “EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY” STANDARD 
Justices Blackmun and White, however, disagreed with the majority’s standard 
in their respective concurrence and dissent.90  Instead, the Justices proposed a 
different standard by which to measure whether a child’s IEP is “appropriate.”91  
“Appropriate,” they decided, should equate to affording a child with disabilities an 
equal educational opportunity.92   
                                                                
83Id. at 200 (“The District Court and the Court of Appeals thus erred when they held that 
the Act requires New York to maximize the potential of each handicapped child 
commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children.”). 
84Id.  The Court ruled, “[i]mplicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a 
‘free appropriate public education’ is the requirement that the education to which access is 
provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.”  Id. 
85Seligmann, supra note 45, at 228. 
86Demmel, supra note 44, at 276.  
87Eyer, supra note 9, at 621 (“Thus, the intent of the Act was more to open the door of 
public education to [children with disabilities] on appropriate terms than to guarantee any 
particular level of education once inside.”  (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
192 (1982))). 
88Sharon C. Streett, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L.J. 35, 45 (1996); see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 195 (stating that the “Act imposes no clear 
obligation upon recipient States beyond the requirement that all handicapped children receive 
some form of specialized education is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that Congress, in 
explaining the need for the Act, equated an ‘appropriate education’ to the receipt of some 
specialized educational services”). 
89Streett, supra note 88, at 46. 
90Rowley, 458 U.S. at 210, 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (White, J., dissenting). 
91Id. 
92Id. at 214 (White, J., dissenting). 
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A.  Justice Blackmun’s Concurrence 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun pronounced that Congress clearly 
intended to guarantee students with disabilities an equal educational opportunity.93  
Otherwise, the legislation would only represent “politically self-serving but 
essentially meaningless language about what the [handicapped] deserve at the hands 
of the state . . . authorities.”94  Declining to follow the majority’s standard, 
questioning whether Amy Rowley’s education was “reasonably calculated to enable 
[her] to receive educational benefits,”95 Justice Blackmun believed an educational 
program, viewed as a whole, must be analyzed according to whether it gives a 
student with disabilities an opportunity to learn and participate in the classroom that 
is substantially equal to the opportunity afforded to nonhandicapped peers.96  This, 
according to Justice Blackmun, should be the standard by which to measure whether 
an education is deemed “appropriate” according to the Act.97 
B.  Justice White’s Dissent 
This standard was further emphasized by Justice White in his dissent.  Agreeing 
that the language on the face of the statute does not imply a substantive standard for 
educational programming beyond “appropriate,” Justice White relied on the purpose 
and legislative history of the Act in determining the equal educational opportunity 
standard was more viable than the majority’s “some educational benefit” 
proclamation.98  Both explicit language within the Act99 and congressional intent 
support this definition.100  Therefore, “appropriate” means affording “handicapped 
children an educational opportunity commensurate with that given other children,”101 
not the “some educational benefit” standard adopted by the majority. 
                                                                
93Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  “Congress unambiguously stated that it intended 
to ‘take a more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee 
that handicapped children are provided equal educational opportunity.’”  Id. 
94Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 32 (1981) (Backmun, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).   
95Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
96Id. 
97Id. at 210-11. 
98Rowley, 458 U.S. at 213 (White, J., dissenting).  “I agree that the language of the Act 
does not contain a substantive standard beyond requiring that the education offered must be 
‘appropriate.’  However, if there are limits not evident from the face of the statute on what 
may be considered an ‘appropriate education,’ they must be found in the purpose of the statute 
or its legislative history.”  Id. 
99Id.  (“The Act itself announces it will provide a ‘full educational opportunity to all 
handicapped children.’”).   
100Id. at 214.  “The legislative history thus directly supports the conclusion that the Act 
intends to give handicapped children an educational opportunity commensurate with that 
given other children.”  Id. 
101Id. 
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Even though Justices Blackmun and White did not reach the same conclusion 
regarding whether Amy Rowley’s education was appropriate, they did agree on the 
standard by which to measure whether an education was “appropriate.”102  Both 
Justices believed students with disabilities must receive an education that provides 
opportunities to learn similar to those given non-disabled students.  It is not enough 
that students receive “some educational benefit,” as the basic floor of opportunity is 
“intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the child 
will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible.”103  To give 
students with disabilities an “equal opportunity to learn,” IEP’s must be measured 
against the “educational opportunity” standard as the “some educational benefit” 
standard is not viable. 
V.  POST-ROWLEY DECISIONS 
A.  Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16 
Although bound by Rowley’s holding, decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
have elaborated on the “some educational benefit” standard, perhaps indicating a 
preference for a higher substantive standard like that suggested by Justices White 
and Blackmun in their respective opinions in Rowley. 104  The Third Circuit, in Polk 
v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, entertained a challenge of an IEP’s 
appropriateness. 105  Christopher Polk, a severely disabled student, required physical 
therapy as part of the related services provided by his IEP.106  His school sought to 
meet this need by providing Christopher’s teacher training in physical therapy.107  
The Polks argued that this did not provide their son with a “free appropriate 
education” as Christopher’s individual needs required he receive therapy directly 
from a licensed physical therapist.108  In its decision, the court identified that 
“meaningful” in “meaningful educational benefit” must demand a level of education 
that is more than de minimis or trivial.109  The court rationalized this interpretation 
through its analysis of congressional intent.110  This holding slightly expanded the 
“some educational benefit” standard, possibly impressing a preference for a higher 
substantive standard like that suggested by Justices White and Blackmun.  
                                                                
102Id. at 211, 214 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (White, J., dissenting). 
103Id. at 215. 
104Polk v. Cent. Susquchanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 1988).  
“Therefore we must examine the Act’s notion of ‘benefit’ and apply a standard that is faithful 
to Congressional intent and consistent with Rowley.”  Id. 
105Id. at 171. 
106Id. at 173-74. 
107Id. at 174. 
108Id.  
109Id. at 180. 
110Id. at 182 (“Instead, we infer that the emphasis on self-sufficiency indicates in some 
respect the quantum benefits the legislators anticipated:  they must have envisioned that 
significant learning would transpire in the special education classroom. . . .”). 
2006-07] THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION 153 
B.  Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education 
Continuing to further the substantive requirement of Rowley, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education, combined the 
Rowley standard with the de minimis requirement from Polk.111  Zachary Deal, a 
child diagnosed with autism, began receiving services from his public school district 
at the age of three, as per his IEP.112  In conjunction with his school-provided 
services, the Deals also provided Zachary with private teaching that followed 
methods of applied behavior analysis (ABA) therapy.113  For the following two 
school years, the IEP team developed plans that utilized a variety of teaching 
methods.114  However, the district continually refused to pay for Zachary’s private 
ABA therapy, neglected to provide extended school year services for the summer of 
1999, and only provided for limited engagement in a regular classroom.115  The 
Deals, desiring that Zachary spend more time in a regular classroom and that the 
district pay for his ABA therapy, subsequently rejected the district’s proposed IEP 
for the 1999-2000 school year and placed Zachary in a private preschool program.116  
The district responded the following year by developing an IEP that primarily placed 
Zachary in a regular kindergarten classroom with various supportive services.117  
Rejecting the proposed IEP once again, the Deals contended the district should pay 
for Zachary’s ABA therapy program and requested an administrative hearing 
alleging violations of IDEA against the district.118  
Among its findings, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the 
district substantively violated the IDEA.119  On appeal, the district court reversed the 
ruling of the ALJ, stating the district did not substantively or procedurally violate the 
IDEA.120  The Deals appealed to the Sixth Circuit.121  Within its analysis of the 
substantive standard required by IDEA, the court noted deference to the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley, but expanded the standard as much as 
                                                                
111Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 861 (6th Cir. 2004).  The court 
followed the Rowley standard stating that the level of education required to be provided to a 
child with a disability must only be calculated to provide the child with more than a de 
minimis educational benefit.  Id. 
112Id. at 845. 
113Id.   
114Id. at 846-47. 
115Id. at 846. 
116Id. at 846-47. 
117Id. at 847. 
118Id. 
119Id.  The ALJ found that “[t]he School System had substantively violated the IDEA by 
failing to provide a proven or even describable methodology for educating autistic children.”  
Id. 
120Id. at 849. 
121Id. 
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possible within its authority.122  Similar to the Third Circuit in Polk, the court first 
stated the educational benefit must be more than de minimis.123  Continuing in its 
substantive analysis, the court profoundly stated this level of substantive review is 
capable of becoming insufficient as “there is a point at which the difference in 
outcomes between two methods can be so great that provision of the lesser program 
could amount to denial of a FAPE.”124  Therefore, the court agreed with other circuit 
court decisions, that “the IDEA requires an IEP to confer a ‘meaningful educational 
benefit’ gauged in relation to the potential of the child at issue.”125  Supporting this 
expansion to the Rowley standard, the court stated:  
[n]othing in Rowley precludes the setting of a higher standard than the 
provision of ‘some’ or ‘any’ educational benefit; indeed, the legislative 
history cited in Rowley provides strong support for a higher standard in a 
case such as this, where the difference in level of education provided can 
mean the difference between self-sufficiency and a life of dependence.126   
Analyzing the Rowley decision and recent legislative history surrounding the 
1997 amendments to the IDEA, the Sixth Circuit concluded that providing only some 
educational benefit would never permit children with disabilities to attain the goals 
Congress foresaw when creating the legislation.127  Following this interpretation and 
in furtherance of the substantive standard imposed by the IDEA, the Sixth Circuit 
reversed and remanded the decision of the district court, requiring the district court 
to analyze whether the education offered to Zachary Deal would provide a 
meaningful educational benefit in consideration of his individual abilities.128 
Deal presented a forceful step among case law authority in defining what is 
considered appropriate, as it furthered the decision of the Third Circuit in Polk.129  
These decisions represent a movement toward a heightened substantive standard, as 
lower courts now analyze an appropriate education to be one that provides “some 
meaningful educational benefit.”130  In citing a standard that is more than “some 
educational benefit,” these recent decisions promulgate a standard more aligned with 
                                                                
122Id. at 854-55. “The Supreme Court has spoken on the level of education that the states 
are required to provide to disabled children. . . . The court explicitly rejected the argument that 
school districts are required to provide services ‘sufficient to maximize each child’s potential 
commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.’”  Id. 
123Deal, 392 F.3d at 861. 
124Id. at 862. 
125Id. 
126Id. at 863.   
127Id. at 864.  “Indeed, states providing no more than some educational benefit could not 
possibly hope to attain the lofty goals proclaimed by Congress.”  Id.  (emphasis in original). 
128Id. at 867. 
129Telephone Interview with Nessa G. Siegel, Esq., Partner, Nessa G. Siegel Co., L.P.A., 
in Cleveland, Ohio (Jan. 16, 2006). 
130Telephone Interview with Kerry M. Agins, Esq., Partner, Nessa G. Siegel Co., L.P.A., 
in Cleveland, Ohio (Jan. 16, 2006). 
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the educational opportunity standard opined by Justices Blackmun and White.  The 
educational opportunity standard requires a level of educational benefit that is more 
than de minimis, one that is meaningful and one that ensures each child is offered a 
full educational opportunity.  The Reauthorization of the IDEA seeks to continue the 
insight of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, as its new regulations also promote the 
adoption of the educational opportunity standard.  
VI.  THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT: A CALL 
TO INCREASE THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD DEFINING “APPROPRIATE” 
The IDEA became the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act 
of 2004 (IDEIA) upon its Reauthorization, effective July 1, 2005.131  Amending 
provisions regarding IEP development and teaching qualifications for children with 
special needs, the IDEIA seeks to further the goals of the 1997 IDEA amendments 
by establishing a higher substantive meaning for an appropriate education than that 
applied in Rowley.132  Once again, the federal government, now through the IDEIA, 
seeks to implement a better education for children with disabilities, as Congress 
found that the implementation of the IDEA “has been impeded by low expectations, 
and an insufficient focus on applying replicable research on proven methods of 
teaching and learning for children with disabilities.”133  This directly reflects the need 
for courts to adopt a new substantive standard for “appropriate,” other than merely 
conferring “some educational benefit.”   
A.  IEP Amendments 
Analyzing the amendments, it first must be noted that the government removed 
mandating the inclusion of short-term objectives and benchmarks in IEPs for all 
students with disabilities.134  These objectives and benchmarks are now only required 
to be included in IEPs for students placed on alternative assessments.135  The new 
                                                                
13120 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006); Cory L. Shindel, One Standard Fits All? Defining 
Achievement Standards for Students with Cognitive Disabilities Within the No Child Left 
Behind Act’s Standardized Framework, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 1025, 1039-40 (2004).  
“Reauthorization of a statute is required when Congress approves sections of a law for a fixed  
period of time.  At the termination of the fixed period, Congress must affirmatively re-approve 
the select provisions, of the IDEA that are permanently authorized, the reauthorization process 
gives Congress an opportunity to reconsider and revise the IDEA generally.”  Id.  
13220 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2006); see Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
13320 U.S.C. § 1400(4) (2006).   
13420 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006); see also CHARLES J. RUSSO ET AL., INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT VS. IDEA ’97: CHARTING THE CHANGES 221-22 
(2005).  The 1997 IDEA stated an IEP must include: 
[A] statement of measurable annual goals, including benchmarks or short-term 
objectives, related to – (1) meeting the child’s needs that result from the child’s 
disability to enable the child to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum; 
and (2) meeting each of the child’s other educational needs that result from the child’s 
disability.   
Id. 
13520 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II).  Students who have IEPs and are unable to participate 
in State or local standardized testing due to their disability are issued alternate assessments to 
replace taking a standardized test.  Alternate Assessments are a “collection of evidence that 
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language reads that an IEP must include “a statement of the child’s present levels of 
academic performance, including – (cc) for children with disabilities who take 
alternative assessments aligned to alternate achievement standards, a description of 
benchmarks or short-term objectives.”136  This omission in the IDEIA facially 
appears to reduce the substantive standard of “appropriate” within the meaning of a 
FAPE.137  However, this concern of the recent exclusion of short-term objectives and 
benchmarks is erroneous. 
In light of the IDEIA becoming law, neither attorneys representing school 
districts nor those working as child advocates, have witnessed the language omitting 
benchmarks to affect or minimize provisions of FAPE.138  Admittedly, this 
elimination might hinder a school district’s ability to measure progress and 
objectively determine the appropriateness of an IEP as only overarching goals will 
need to be stipulated in an IEP.139  However, in practice, while the omission of the 
language is a loss for the child, schools are still including short-term objectives and 
benchmarks for most students as it safeguards the school districts from entertaining 
challenges regarding their provision of FAPE.140  School districts will also likely be 
advised by their attorneys to decide whether to include these statements on a case-
by-case basis looking at the needs of the individual child.141  Furthermore, this 
omission is not likely to hinder the level of what constitutes an appropriate 
education, as school districts will now have to craft more measurable goals to ensure 
that a FAPE is still being provided.142  If there can no longer be reliance on short-
term objectives and benchmarks to provide measurable standards, school districts 
must ensure written goals are precise and accurately convey that an appropriate 
education is being offered.143  Additionally, some state laws still require short-term 
                                                           
shows student performance of standards-based knowledge and skills within the context of 
classroom instruction.”  Ohio Department of Education, http://www.ode.state.oh.us/ 
proficiency/Alternate_Assessment/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2006). 
13620 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(cc). 
137Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Aligning of Maligning?  Getting Inside a New IDEA, Getting 
Behind No Child Left Behind and Getting Outside of it All, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 3 
(2004); see also Shindel, supra note 131, at 1077-78.   
138Telephone Interview with Agins, Esq., supra note 130; Telephone Interview with 
Siegel, Esq., supra note 129; Telephone Interview with Christina Peer, Esq., Squire, Sanders 
& Dempsey, in Cleveland, Ohio (Jan. 17, 2006). 
139Telephone Interview with Agins, Esq., supra note 130. 
140Telephone Interview with Siegel, Esq., supra note 129. 
141Telephone Interview with Peer, Esq., supra note 138.  Even if a student is not on an 
alternative assessment, it might be advisable to still include short-term objectives and 
benchmarks.  Whether or not to include short-term objectives and benchmarks must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.  Id. 
142Id. 
143Id. 
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objectives and benchmarks to be included in every IEP.144  This negates the 
elimination of this IEP feature even though the IDEIA does not require it.   
The objective of this omission within the IDEIA is to reduce the paperwork 
burden placed on special education teachers, not to reduce the meaning of what 
constitutes an “appropriate” education.145  The legislators hoped that a reduction in 
required paperwork would enable educators to focus on quality education and allot 
more time for direct instruction.146  Therefore, combined with the remaining 
amendments to IEP development and the requirement that teachers become highly 
qualified, the retraction of mandating that each IEP contain short-term objectives and 
benchmarks is likely minimal and does not outweigh the remaining provisions that 
support the incorporation of a higher substantive level for an education to be deemed 
“appropriate” than that purported by the Court in Rowley.  
The “some educational benefit” standard is no longer viable, as the IDEIA 
implements new provisions that highlight a desire to increase the standard of what 
constitutes an “appropriate” education.  Because a free appropriate public education 
is measured through a child’s IEP, many aspects of the IDEIA sought to address and 
establish more stringent provisions in IEPs that emphasize substantive education as 
opposed to mere procedural guidelines.   
First, the statement of a student’s present levels in the IEP must now include 
academic and functional performance.147  Emphasizing that both academic and 
functional performance levels be included clarifies the vague “educational 
performance” term used in the 1997 amendments.148  This added terminology reflects 
the Senate’s desire that children with disabilities be afforded the same opportunities 
as individuals without disabilities to live independent and productive lives, as 
functional performance speaks to incorporating life skill goals.149  Ensuring that 
students with disabilities are afforded not only educational opportunities, but also 
opportunities to live independently and self-sufficiently, imposes a greater 
                                                                
144Id. Ohio still mandates that short term objectives and benchmarks be incorporated in an 
IEP.  Id. 
145Hearings, supra note 53, at 64 (statement of Robert Runkel, Administrator of the 
Division of Special Education, State of Montana).  
Our current preoccupation in special education on process has contributed to the 
paperwork burden that you hear so much about. . . . Most parents I know are more 
concerned about the benefit their child is receiving from the program than they are 
about the number of parental rights brochures they have received . . . some parents 
fear that a paperwork reduction could mean the loss of certain procedural rights now 
afforded under the protections of the IDEA.  It is our job to maintain the protections of 
the IDEA while solving our dilemma with paperwork. 
Id.  See also 20 U.S.C. § 1408(a) (2006). 
146RUSSO ET AL., supra note 134, at 32. 
14720 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2006).  “The term ‘individualized education program’ 
or ‘IEP’ means a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, 
and revised in accordance with this section and that includes . . . a statement of the child’s 
present levels of academic and functional performance. . . .” Id.   
148RUSSO ET AL., supra note 134, at 221.   
149Hearings, supra note 53, at 1 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).  
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substantive quality to education than just “some educational benefit.”  The IDEIA 
speaks to ensuring lifelong benefits, not just some meaningful education.  The 
incorporation of functional performance in the IDEIA language purports to further 
the need to incorporate a substantive standard that expands and departs from the 
views of Rowley.150   
Additionally, an IEP must now describe how a child’s progress toward meeting 
annual goals will be measured and when periodic reports will be provided.151  This 
increases accountability standards important to Congress in meeting the goals of the 
IDEIA.152  It also ensures authorities can no longer claim that a child is progressing 
when IEP goals and objectives remain identical over consecutive years.153  
Accountability that primarily focuses on procedural compliance regarding special 
education and related services is no longer viable, as it neglects to hold authorities 
accountable for the substantive aspect of a special education program.154  Requiring 
documented statements regarding how a child’s progress will be measured and when 
reports will be provided aids in ensuring students make “strides towards challenging 
and appropriate learning and developmental goals.”155  This language advocates 
documenting clear progression, which seeks definitive progress, not just minimal 
growth.  
Furthermore, special education and related services provided to students with 
disabilities must now be based upon peer-reviewed research when available.156  This 
requires school and state officials to consider the best practices and methods that 
peer-reviewed journals and conferences endorse.157  School officials will no longer 
be able to justify services on what they deem acceptable.  This addition to IEP 
development is in direct contrast to Rowley’s determination that the standard for 
education of students with disabilities is to merely implement only a basic floor of 
                                                                
150Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
15120 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(III) (2006). 
152Hearings, supra note 53, at 17 (statement of Sen. Jack Reed) (“Accountability and 
monitoring of programs must be improved.”). 
153Id. at 21 (statement of Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary for Special Education 
and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education). 
154PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., A NEW ERA: REVITALIZING 
SPECIAL EDUC. FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 36 (2002) [hereinafter COMMISSION].  “In 
testimony and public comment the Commission heard repeatedly about the need to focus 
special education accountability on the results achieved by students with disabilities.  
Witnesses from a variety of perspectives told us the current approach to accountability in 
special education is too focused on procedural compliance.”  Id. 
155Id.  
15620 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (2006).   
The term ‘individualized education program’ or ‘IEP’ means a written statement for 
each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance 
with this section and that includes -  . . . (IV) a statement of the special education and 
related services and supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research 
to the extent practicable. . . .   
Id.   
157RUSSO ET AL., supra note 134, at 223. 
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opportunity.158  Requiring schools to base services upon peer-reviewed research 
requires educators to do more than just open the door to public education for students 
with disabilities.  Instead, the IDEIA requires authorities to research and consider 
best practices, not simply those that are adequate or will only produce some progress.   
Finally, regarding IEP development, the IDEIA is dedicated to improving 
transition services within a child’s IEP.159  Transition services are a coordinated set 
of activities for a child with disabilities that are focused on improving a child’s 
movement from school to post-school activities.160  Once again, functional and 
academic performance is clearly emphasized, as the definition of transition services 
was refined to not only state that the activities promote movement from school to 
post-school activities, but also that transition activities are “focused on improving the 
academic and functional achievement of the child with a disability to facilitate the 
child’s movement from school to post-school activities.”161  Additionally, the 
definition in the 1997 amendments stated transition service activities must be 
“designed within an outcome-oriented process,”162 while the IDEIA states these 
activities must be “designed within a results-oriented process.”163  The key is no 
longer to only reach an outcome, but to achieve specific results within attaining the 
prescribed outcome.       
Prior to the IDEIA, transition services were often not implemented to the fullest 
extent, resulting in non-beneficial outcomes.164  The language regarding these 
services in the IDEA was also confusing, leading to the provision of ineffective 
services.165  Accordingly, under the IDEIA, an IEP must now include “appropriate 
measurable postsecondary goals based upon age appropriate transition 
assessments.”166  Transition services must be addressed in a child’s IEP no later than 
                                                                
158Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982). 
159Hearings, supra note 53, at 2 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy); see also 
COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 47.  “The Commission finds that IDEA must be changed to 
clearly link students’ long-range transition goals to the development of the annual IEP goals, 
objectives and activities.”  Id. 
16020 U.S.C. § 1401(34) (2006).  
16120 U.S.C. § 1401(34)(A) (emphasis added).   
162RUSSO ET AL., supra note 134, at 21. 
16320 U.S.C. § 1401(34)(A).   
164COMMISION, supra note 154, at 46.  “The Commission found that transition services are 
not being implemented to the fullest extent possible and that meaningful results do not 
happen.” 
165Id.   
School personnel must be provided clear and concise rules and regulations outlining 
how to provide effective and relevant transition services to students with disabilities 
seeking to enter the workforce immediately following high school as well as for 
students planning to attend college.  The IDEA’s current requirements are too complex 
and do not adequately meet this need. 
Id. 
16620 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(cc) (2006). 
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when the child reaches the age of sixteen167 and they must serve to assist a child in 
reaching enumerated postsecondary goals.168  Emphasizing transition services 
exhibits a heightened standard of “appropriate,” as the IDEIA is concerned with 
increasing a child with disabilities’ progression through life.169  Congress’s goal is 
not for education to provide only “some educational benefit,” but to encourage 
independence and allow students with disabilities to become “self-sufficient 
members of their communities.”170  Therefore transition services, through the IDEIA, 
now emphasize results, not just a scripted outcome.171  It is not sufficient for students 
with disabilities to just reach the outcome of transitioning into society.  Students 
must be provided the tools and knowledge to live independently; hence, the results of 
transition services are to be emphasized.172  Accordingly, efforts to increase 
transition services directly supports strengthening the meaning of “appropriate” as 
Congress is concerned with a child’s progress through life’s stages, not merely grade 
to grade progress.173    
B.  Highly Qualified Teachers 
The IDEIA also seeks to ensure that special educators are highly qualified and 
can provide the level of education necessary for students with disabilities.174  Under 
the IDEIA, special education teachers must now meet the provisions of “highly 
qualified” status to be employed to teach special education.175  This requirement 
parallels the mandate of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and 
aligns with the No Child Left Behind Act, which requires all teachers to meet highly 
qualified standards in addition to obtaining an educational license.176  To be deemed 
highly qualified, a teacher, according to the No Child Left Behind Act, must possess 
full certification, a bachelor’s degree and prove competence in subject knowledge 
and teaching.177  The IDEIA expands upon this definition and details specific 
provisions for special educators which include that: 
                                                                
16720 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII). 
16820 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII). 
169Hearings, supra note 53, at 2 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).  “Most 
important, we need to explore new ways to aid children with disabilities as they progress 
through life’s many transitions from early childhood to elementary school, from elementary 
school to high school, from high school to college, and on to a good job.” Id. 
170Hearings, supra note 53, at 5 (statement of Sen. James M. Jeffords).  
171See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(34) (2006). 
172See COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 47-48. 
173Hearings, supra note 53, at 2 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). 
174Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins). 
17520 U.S.C. § 1401(10) (2006).  
176RUSSO ET AL., supra note 134, at 7. 
177United States Department of Education, http://www.ed.gov/nclb/methods/teachers/ 
teachers-faq.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2006). 
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(i) the teacher has obtained full State certification as a special 
education teacher (including certification obtained through alternative 
routes to certification), or passed the State special education teacher 
licensing examination, and holds a license to teach in the State as a special 
education teacher . . . (ii) the teacher has not had a special education 
certification or licensure requirements waived on an emergency, 
temporary, or provisional basis; and (iii) the teacher holds at least a 
bachelor’s degree. . . .178 
Requiring personnel to be highly qualified reflects statements made by the 
Commission on Excellence in Special Education which recommended that to 
improve special education services: 
States and districts must devise new strategies to recruit more personnel 
who are highly qualified to educate students with disabilities.  State 
licenses and endorsements for all teachers should require specific training 
related to meeting the needs of students with disabilities and integrating 
parents into special education services.  States must develop collaborative, 
career-long professional developmental systems that conform to 
professional standards.179   
While recommending recruitment of teachers and stipulating that special 
education teachers be highly qualified, committees proposing amendments for the 
IDEIA also recognized the current shortage of special education teachers.180  Since 
1988, the field of special education has been plagued by shortages and the IDEA has 
not increased teacher retention, as the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA neglected to 
address this problematic issue.181  In developing the IDEIA, however, teacher 
shortages were addressed and solutions to this problem were recommended.182  Such 
solutions included higher wages, differential pay scales, and improving working 
conditions.183  Because of Congress’s realization and commitment to retain special 
educators, it is unlikely that requiring personnel to be highly qualified will further 
deter individuals from entering the field of education.  Instead, educators will now 
desire to provide an appropriate education to students with disabilities and be 
qualified to do so. 
The purpose of implementing requirements for schools to employ highly 
qualified teachers is to ensure special education reaches higher levels and meets 
                                                                
17820 U.S.C. § 1401(10)(B). 
179COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 51. 
180Id. at 52-54. 
181Id. at 52, 54.  “The growing shortage of special education teachers alarms this 
Commission.  Ninety-eight percent of school districts report special education teacher 
shortages.  Roughly 10 percent of special education positions nationally – 39,140 positions – 
are filled by uncertified personnel who serve approximately 600,000 students with 
disabilities.”  Id. at 52. 
182Id. at 55.  The Commission suggested States and districts devise new approaches to 
retain special educators who are highly qualified.  Id.   
183Id.   
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more rigorous demands.184  Untrained educators hinder movements to increase the 
achievement of students with disabilities.185  “Consistently, the single biggest factor 
affecting academic progress of populations of children is the effectiveness of the 
individual classroom teacher – period.  The sequence of teachers that a child has will 
add more to their own personal academic achievement than probably any other 
single factor.”186  Stipulating that teachers must be highly qualified will, therefore, 
provide a greater educational benefit to students with disabilities.187  Providing a 
greater educational benefit once again speaks to the IDEIA’s promulgation that a 
higher substantive standard be associated with the meaning of “appropriate.”  
The crux of the IDEIA is to promulgate higher standards for the education of 
students with disabilities.  Each of the amendments regarding IEP development and 
the stipulation that teachers must now obtain highly qualified status support this 
contention and promote the purpose stated in the IDEIA to “assess, and ensure the 
effectiveness of, efforts to educate children with disabilities.”188   
VII.  CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION 
IMPROVEMENT ACT 
Congressional intent, in addition to the language of the IDEIA, also impresses a 
need for a more rigorous substantive standard in educating students with disabilities.  
The amendments to the IDEIA focus attention on substantive components, thus 
analyzing and improving the meaning of “appropriate” in “free appropriate public 
education.”  Furthermore, Congress’ intent is clearly to strengthen legislation and 
provide “the right services to the right children at the right time, in the right settings, 
and with the right personnel to achieve the right results.”189  Findings by Congress 
stipulating the need for the IDEIA noted that increasing results for students with 
disabilities “is an essential element of our national policy.”190  As noted in the first 
hearings discussing the Reauthorization, “[w]hile progress has been made, the true 
                                                                
184Hearings, supra note 53, at 16 (statement of  Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary 
for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education).  “[I]f we 
do not have highly-qualified teachers instructing students, we are never going to get the kinds 
of results that parents have a right to expect and Congress has the right to demand.” Id. See 
also COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 52.  
185COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 51. 
186Id. at 52. 
187Hearings, supra note 53, at 4 (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins) (“Providing more 
quality special education teachers will bring us a great deal further toward providing quality 
education to students with disabilities.”). 
18820 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(4) (2006).   
189Hearings, supra note 53, at 11 (statement of Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary 
for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education). 
19020 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1).  “Improving educational results for children with disabilities is 
an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with 
disabilities.”  Id.  See also H. R. REP. NO. 108-813, pt. 2 (2005).  “The report emphasized the 
need to move the IDEA away from compliance with cumbersome and bureaucratic rules and 
restore the focus to educational results for students.”  Id.  
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promise of [the] IDEA – a free appropriate public education for all children with 
disabilities – has not yet been realized.”191  Eighty percent of states failed to comply 
with the requirements concerning a “free appropriate public education”192 and 
compliance has been focused on process, not results.193  While compliance with 
process has produced gains for the education of students with disabilities, it is now 
time to introduce a culture focused on accountability and emphasizing results.194   
Furthermore, students with special needs remain “those most at risk of being left 
behind” creating “an urgency for reform that few can deny.”195  Congress, therefore, 
in reauthorizing the IDEA, sought to refocus the states and emphasize substantive, 
not procedural, aspects of the law.196  The IDEIA should be flexible in order to 
achieve desired outcomes for students with disabilities.197  Additionally, the IDEIA 
should include “a unified system of services from birth through 21, and simplify the  
. . . IEP to focus on substantive outcomes.”198   
Congress’ emphasis on substantive results and its realization that states 
continuously fail to meet the full expectations of the IDEA’s premise and vision, 
unequivocally demands that courts reanalyze the current substantive standard.  If 
increasing results for students with disabilities is truly a primary national policy, the 
“some educational benefit” standard must be discarded.  This standard does not 
effectuate Congress’s goal to ensure substantive results, as it only ensures an 
education will be more than trivial.  Students’ individual needs and unique 
capabilities leading to future success will not always be accounted for in a disabled 
student’s educational programming if only “some benefit” need be shown for schools 
to be in compliance with the IDEIA.  This level of education does not pass muster 
under the standards Congress sought with the issuance of the IDEIA. Accordingly, 
the “some educational benefit” standard set forth by Rowley is no longer appropriate 
in evaluating the education of students with disabilities. 
                                                                
191Hearings, supra note 53, at 6 (statement of Sen. Jack Reed). 
192Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Jack Reed). 
193Id. at 14 (statement of Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary for Special Education 
and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education).  “Under current law, compliance 
does not focus on improved results for children.  Instead, compliance has been too focused on 
process as opposed to results.”  Id.  See also COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 7.  “[T]he current 
system often places process above results, and bureaucratic compliance above student 
achievement, excellence and outcomes.”  Id. 
194Rosenbaum, supra note 137, at 5.  “Paige unveiled a set of principles which stated that 
the ‘IDEA must move from a culture of compliance with process to a culture of accountability 
for results.’”  Id. 
195COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 4.  “Although it is true that special education has 
created a base of civil rights and legal protections, children with disabilities remain those most 
at risk of being left behind.  The facts create an urgency for reform that few can deny.”  Id. 
196Hearings, supra note 53, at 14 (statement of Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary 
for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education)  (“We want 
the States to focus on results and compliance with the key substantive requirements of the 
law.”). 
197COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 11. 
198Id. 
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VIII.  THE ADOPTION OF A NEW SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD 
The purpose of the IDEIA is to “ensure that all children with disabilities have 
available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special 
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them 
for further education, employment, and independent living.”199  Fulfilling this ideal is 
essential to the success of the legislation and the education of students with 
disabilities.  Minimal efforts by educators will not lead to this desired result; 
however, this is all the Rowley standard requires by stipulating students will receive 
“some educational benefit.”   
Lower courts have realized this problem and have responded by interpreting 
Rowley to require that education must provide a meaningful benefit.200  This 
expansion, while making apparent the desire that a more substantive education be 
offered to students with disabilities, cannot be fully realized under the current 
Rowley precedent.  Therefore, a new substantive standard for determining 
“appropriate” within a free appropriate public education must be adopted.  Based 
upon the language of the IDEIA and the goals Congress sought to achieve through 
the legislation, the “educational opportunity” standard suggested by Justices 
Blackmun and White in Rowley should be the new standard in determining whether 
an offered education is “appropriate” within the meaning of the IDEIA.201 
The “educational opportunity” standard stipulates students with disabilities must 
be provided an education substantially similar to that afforded to their non-disabled 
peers.202  This is not to suggest that a child’s education must be maximized,203 only 
that children with disabilities be afforded the same opportunities to learn as non-
disabled students receive.204  Educational curriculum for students without disabilities 
is focused on providing knowledge and tools to assist with post-secondary education, 
future employment, and preparing them to live independently.  This is the exact 
focus special education programming must have as purported by the purpose of the 
IDEIA.205   
Providing an equal educational opportunity not only reflects explicit language in 
the IDEIA,206 but the heightened procedures incorporated through the amendments 
                                                                
19920 U.S.C. §1400(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
200See Polk v. Cent. SuSusquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988); 
see also Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004).  
201Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 211, 214 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(White, J., dissenting).  
202Id. at 213-14 (White, J. dissenting).  
203Id. at 212-13 (White, J., dissenting) (“Certainly the language of the statute contains no 
requirement like the one imposed by the lower courts – that states maximize the potential of 
handicapped children ‘commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.’”). 
204Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Rather, the question is whether Amy’s program, 
viewed as a whole, offered her an opportunity to understand and participate in the classroom 
that was substantially equal to that given her nonhandicapped classmates.”). 
205See 20 U.S.C. §1400(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
20620 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006) (providing that a state must establish a goal of providing a 
full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities). 
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and congressional intent also advocate implementing the “educational opportunity” 
standard as the new measurement of “appropriate.”207  The IDEIA itself serves to 
provide students with disabilities every opportunity afforded to non-disabled 
Americans.208  As noted in the House Report detailing the activities of the Committee 
on Education and the Workforce, “[n]ow more than ever, we must see that children 
with disabilities are given access to an education that maximizes their unique 
abilities and provides them with the tools for later success.”209  This thought is 
heralded in the numerous amendments written in the IDEIA.  Each new IEP 
provision speaks to enhancing a child’s education by providing for life-long benefits, 
accounting for functional performance and concentrating on results, not just a 
minimum outcome.210  Additionally, requiring that special educators become highly 
qualified ensures students with disabilities will receive the same level of education as 
non-disabled students, as teachers will now be appropriately trained.  Each 
amendment represents the sentiments expressed in the “educational opportunity” 
standard, as they serve to detail an education extremely similar to that offered to 
regular education students.  Focusing on a curriculum that will ensure future success 
promotes societal goals to educate students for independent and functional lives.  
Accordingly, to meet society’s expectations of developing productive individuals, 
education of students with disabilities must do more than provide some benefit.  It 
must provide these students the same opportunities to learn and succeed as their non-
disabled peers.  Therefore, the “educational opportunity” standard, which requires 
courts to determine whether a disabled child’s IEP provides “an educational 
opportunity commensurate with that given other children,”211 should be the standard 
adopted by the courts.212  
If the goal is to give all handicapped students the same opportunities as non-
handicapped students to learn, function, progress, and live independently, a standard 
for “appropriate” must mean more than merely conferring “some educational 
benefit.”  The standard does not hold officials accountable to the purpose and high 
standards set forth by the IDEIA, and does not purport to ensure a level of education 
equal to that given to non-disabled peers.  The focus for the education of students 
with disabilities has shifted to emphasize the importance of the outcomes of the 
provided education, not merely procedural compliance with the law.213  The 
                                                                
207Hearings, supra note 53, at 12 (statement of Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary 
for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education).   
208Id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). 
209H.R. REP. NO. 108-813, pt.2, at 140 (2005). 
210See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq. (2006). 
211Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 214 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). 
212Id. at 214 n.2 (“In any case, the very language that the majority quotes from Mills, . . . 
sets a standard not of some education, but of educational opportunity equal to that of 
nonhandicapped children.”). 
213Hearings, supra note 53, at 64 (statement of Robert Runkel, Administrator of the 
Division of Special Education, State of Montana).   
I cannot emphasize enough how important it is to focus on outcomes for students with 
disabilities.  A local education agency can be in total compliance with every 
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“educational opportunity” standard, promulgated through the IDEIA, fulfills both 
congressional and societal expectations of equality in educational opportunities for 
the disabled and the non-disabled, and therefore should be the accepted standard in 
this country. 
IX.  FINANCIAL CONCERNS 
Intrinsic with the adoption of a new substantive standard for what constitutes an 
“appropriate” education is the implication that this result will surely impose greater 
financial costs.  With the heightening of any standard, it must be expected that costs 
will increase to some degree.214  Since the enactment of the IDEA, Congress has 
been aware of the financial burdens that the federal law requires.215  However, 
Congress’s ability to rationalize such expenditures revolves around the theory that 
mandating greater educational attention for students with disabilities will result in 
limiting future monetary spending, as these students will be better able to be self-
sufficient members of society.216   
A.  Past Financial Difficulties 
Upon the original enactment of the IDEA, the federal government promised to 
assume forty percent of the costs associated with implementing the provisions set 
forth in the law.217  States would then be responsible for the remainder of the 
balance.218  Unfortunately, there has been a historical under-funding of special 
education at the federal level.219  Federal government reimbursement never reached 
levels of supplying forty percent of special education funding.  In fact, the federal 
government reimbursement decreased to comprise only seven percent of special 
education expenditures.220  While this results in billions of public dollars spent 
annually, the educational level envisioned by the IDEA is applied inconsistently and 
unevenly among states and school districts.221 
B.  Resolutions to Solve Financial Difficulties 
These facts are disheartening for special education funding.  However, while it 
may seem unlikely that a heightened substantive standard could be monetarily 
supported, this consideration was taken into account upon the drafting of the IDEIA.  
The Commission on Excellence, in its proposals for the IDEIA, specifically targeted 
                                                           
procedural step and still not guarantee positive educational outcomes for its students.  
That is why it is so important to continue to strengthen our focus on outcomes.   
Id.  
214Eyer, supra note 9, at 636. 
215Russell, supra note 21, at 1514. 
216Id. 
217Goldman, supra note 26, at 283. 
218Id.  
219COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 29. 
220Goldman, supra note 26, at 283. 
221Id.   
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financing problems and ways to resolve concerns to ensure states and districts are 
provided adequate means to provide the desired educational results.222  The 
Commission proposed to revise calculations of excess costs and to maximize the use 
of federal funds.223  The goal is to allow states greater flexibility in their spending 
and to balance the shared responsibility for financing special education.224  The 
Commission further proposed to increase funding to states who have submitted state 
improvement plans consistent with No Child Left Behind for implementing new 
accountability systems that will better measure results for students with 
disabilities.225  The IDEIA echoed the sentiments and goals of the Commission.226  
Now included in the law is the federal government’s original promise of providing 
for forty percent of special education funding.227  The government has set the goal to 
achieve this level of support by the year 2011.228 
While financial constraints do play a significant role in being able to adopt a 
more sufficient substantive standard, they should not halt the progress towards 
amending the “some educational benefit” standard.  The federal government is not 
ignoring the fact that special education requires funding and has addressed these 
concerns in the IDEIA.  Additionally, opinion polls calculated during the enactment 
and passage of the IDEIA proved Americans were more concerned with emphasizing 
“high standards and accountability for results” to improve public schools than 
increasing government spending.229  Any time improvement is sought, costs must be 
incurred.  However, providing the proper education for students with disabilities that 
the law and Congress seek to ensure must take precedent.     
X.  CONCLUSION 
The amendments made in the IDEIA exhibit intent to implement a 
heightened substantive meaning of the word “appropriate.”  Evident in the 
amendments is a desire to provide a quality education to students with disabilities.  
Therefore, the “some educational benefit” standard devised in Rowley should be 
abandoned, as it does not coincide with the recent standards set forth by the IDEIA.  
Applying the “educational opportunity” standard, however, aligns with the purpose 
of the IDEIA.  This standard increases substantive provisions, as it ensures students 
with disabilities are afforded an opportunity commensurate with that given to other 
children.  Therefore, the “educational opportunity” standard, directly echoing 
                                                                
222COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 29.  
223Id. 
224Id. at 33.  “We must allow states greater flexibility to financially manage their short-
term and long-term financial responsibility.  Federal policy with respect to IDEA funding must 
give states more discretionary ability to direct funds that best serve children with disabilities in 
their state rather than a prescribed set of requirements that do not take unique local conditions 
and needs into account.”  Id. 
225Id.   
226See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq. (2006). 
227RUSSO ET AL., supra note 134, at 95.   
228Id.   
229H.R. REP NO. 108-813, pt. 2, at 9 (2005). 
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congressional intent and explicit language in the IDEIA, should be the determinate 
against which an “appropriate” education is measured.  
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